Responsibility and Compensation Rights by Vallentyne, Peter
RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPENSATION RIGHTS 
Peter Vallentyne 
 
I address an issue that arises for rights theories that recognize rights to compensation for rights-
intrusions. Do individuals who never pose any risk of harm to others have a right, against a 
rights-intruder, to full compensation for any resulting intrusion-harm, or is the right limited in 
some way by the extent to which the intruder was agent-responsible for the intrusion-harm (e.g., 
the extent to which the harm was a foreseeable result of her autonomous choices)? Although this 
general issue of strict liability vs. fault liability has been much analyzed and debated, there is a 
promising position that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been much discussed. This is the 
view that (1) when the intruder is agent-responsible for violating the rights (e.g., does so 
knowingly), she owes the intrudee compensation for the entire intrusion-harm, but (2) when the 
intruder is not agent-responsible for wrongly intruding upon the rights (because the intrusion was 
not wrong or because the intruder could not reasonably have known it was wrong), then she 
owes the intrudee compensation only for the intrusion-harm for which she is agent-responsible 
(and not, for example, harm that she could not have reasonably foreseen). I shall develop and 
motivate this position without attempting a full defense. Throughout, I focus on the rights of the 
intrudee, against the intruder, to compensation and the correlative duty of the intruder to the 
intrudee. 
 I’m pleased and honored to have this paper included in this collection in honor of Hillel 
Steiner. Much of what I know about rights and libertarianism I learned from him – both from his 
written works and from his very helpful correspondence over the years. Moreover, his 
intellectual rigor, honesty, and modesty have been a source of inspiration. Although Hillel has 
2 
not written extensively on compensation for intrusion-harms, it is a topic central to his view of 
justice, as it is to mine.1 
 
1. Background 
 
We shall focus on theories that recognize certain basic rights (such as the right not to be killed or 
assaulted), where these include rights to compensation (and associated enforcement rights) for a 
rights-intrusion. Such theories hold that, at least under certain conditions, agents owe 
compensation for the intrusion-harm (i.e., harm from a rights-intrusion) that they impose on 
others. 
A person’s rights define certain boundaries, which, if crossed, raise the question of 
whether the right has been intruded upon (as opposed to merely crossed). If rights are understood 
as protecting choices, then crossing the boundary of a right does not intrude upon the right, if the 
crossing is with the valid permission of the right-holder.2 Rights can, however, be understood as 
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 See, for example, his article "Choice and Circumstance" (Steiner 1997), in which he argues that 
compensation for intrusion-harms is an important, if neglected, issue for luck-egalitarians. 
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 Throughout, I understand rights as durable rights, as opposed to effective rights in a context. 
Thus, when I grant revocable permission for you to use my car, I maintain the durable right, 
against you, not to use my car (without my consent)—even though in that context, I have no 
effective right, against you, that you not use it. The fact that I can revoke my permission shows 
that I still have the durable right. By contrast, if I sell you my car, then I transfer my rights over 
the car to you and no longer have the durable right. 
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protecting interests—with boundary crossings being intrusions, for example, when they are 
against the interests of the right-holder.3 There is also the possibility (which I favor) that rights 
that protect both choices and interests, with the protection of choices taking priority. In general, 
however, I here remain neutral on this issue. For simplicity of presentation, I shall focus on the 
choice-protecting account. 
We shall be asking what compensation rights individuals have in virtue of their rights 
being intruded upon, where intrusion is understood as follows (assuming a choice-protecting 
conception of rights for simplicity). If the boundary is crossed with the permission of the holder, 
then the right is not intruded upon. If the boundary is crossed without the right-holder’s 
permission, then her right is intruded upon. A rights intrusion does not, however, establish that 
the intrusion was impermissible. If the intrusion was not the result of an autonomous choice of 
the intruder (e.g., the wind unexpectedly blew her against you or she attacked you while insane), 
then the right is not infringed and the intrusion is neither permissible nor impermissible (because 
not the result of an autonomous choice).4 If, however, the intrusion is the result of an 
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 For superb discussion of the debate between choice-protecting and interest-protecting 
conceptions of rights, see Kramer, Simmons, and Steiner 1998. 
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 This terminology departs from that used by Thomson (1990, 366-69; 1991, 300-302), who 
lumps non-autonomous intrusions along with infringements and allows that they can be 
violations. Otsuka (1994), however, successfully argues that such non-autonomous intrusions 
cannot be violations (e.g., because rocks and bears can intrude upon rights but cannot act 
wrongly). It follows, I believe, that they cannot even be infringements, since such intrusions are 
not wrong even in the absence of special justificatory conditions. Hence, we need the more 
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autonomous choice of the intruder, then the right is infringed.5 Because rights need not be 
absolute, the infringement of a right need not be impermissible.6 Sometimes, there may be 
special justifying conditions that specify that the right may be permissibly overridden under 
certain conditions (e.g., avoiding social catastrophe).7 If, however, the infringement is not 
justified by such considerations, then the right is violated and the intrusion is impermissible.  
We shall be addressing what compensation is owed for each of the following ways of 
intruding upon a right: 
 
Intrusion: Borders defined by rights were crossed by the intruder without permission of the right-
holder. 
Non-autonomous intrusion: The intrusion is not the result of an autonomous choice of the 
intruder and thus neither permissible nor impermissible. 
Infringement: The intrusion is the result of an autonomous choice of the intruder and is 
thus either permissible or impermissible. 
                                                                                                                                                             
general notion of intrusion to cover non-autonomous intrusions. 
5
 I use “infringe” in the sense given by Thomson (e.g., 1990, 122) according to which violations 
are an impermissible kind of infringement. Others reserve “infringe” for cases of permissible 
infringement. See, for example, McMahan (2005, 388) and Coleman (1994, 129). 
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 Actually, I believe that, fully specified (in perhaps highly conditional ways), all rights are 
absolute, but I here waive that concern. 
7
 The justifying conditions can (and typically do) appeal to the objective facts about the situation, 
and not merely to the evidence that the agent has, or should have had. 
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Mere infringement: Justificatory conditions hold for the infringement of the right. 
The action is not wrong in virtue of the infringement (but may be for other 
reasons; see below). 
Violation: Justificatory conditions do not hold for the infringement of the right. 
The action is wrong in virtue of the infringement. 
  
It’s worth noting that, although a rights-violation entails that an infringement is 
impermissible, the reverse entailment does not hold. An infringement of a given right can be 
impermissible without being a violation. Justificatory conditions for the infringement of the 
given right might hold (and thus the right is not violated), but the infringement might be wrong 
for some other reason. It might violate an impersonal constraint or might violate some other right 
(perhaps of someone else). Thus, an infringement of a right can be wrong (impermissible) 
without violating that right.8 We shall return to this below. 
 Throughout, I shall focus on the case where the intrudee is strictly harmless in the sense 
of not having ever imposed an intrusion-harm on anyone and with no chance of doing so in the 
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 In places, Thomson (e.g., 1976, 40; 1977, 51) seems to define violations as any impermissible 
infringement. In Thomson 1990, however, she more cautiously states that an infringement is a 
violation only if it is impermissible (leaving open when further conditions are necessary for an 
infringement to be a violation). My definition of a violation requires that the infringement of the 
right be impermissible because there are no justificatory conditions for the infringement of that 
right—and not for other reasons (impersonal wrongs, violations of other people’s rights). I 
suspect that this is what Thomson had in mind all along. 
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future. Although few, if any, people are strictly harmless in this sense, this is the core case. 
Intrudees who are not strictly harmless may be owed significantly less than full compensation 
(e.g., compensation only for the harm from excess force used to stop them from imposing 
intrusion-harm). That, however, is a topic for another time. Here I focus exclusively on intrudees 
who are strictly harmless. 
I shall focus on the question of what an intruder owes an intrudee. I shall not address the 
question of what happens if the intrudee dies before fully compensated—either because the 
intruder killed her or because she died for unrelated reasons. It’s clear that the debt-claim cannot 
simply disappear, and merely transferring the debt to the intrudee’s heirs fails to reflect the fact 
that compensation was never fully provided to the intrudee. This is a difficult and important 
question that I will set aside in this paper. 
There are two main views about the duty to compensate for one’s intrusion-harms. On the 
strict-liability view, intruding agents have a duty to compensate for the intrusion-harm for which 
they are causally responsible.9 By contrast, on the less demanding agent-responsibility (or fault) 
view, intruding agents have a duty to compensate for the intrusion-harm for which they are 
agent-responsible (“outcome-responsible”, “morally responsible”).10 To be agent-responsible for 
an outcome, the agent must be causally responsible for the outcome and the outcome must be 
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 See, for example, Epstein 1973. 
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 See, for example, Coleman 1992, chs. 16-18; 1994, and Perry 1992. For discussion and 
criticism of these views, see Zipursky 1998. The view that I propose is a kind of responsibility 
account, but the role played by agent-responsibility for violating rights (i.e., culpability) is, I 
believe, not present in the work of Coleman or Perry. 
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“suitably reflective” of the agent’s autonomous agency. There is much debate about what exactly 
determines when an individual is agent-responsible for something,11 but it’s clear that one can be 
causally responsible for harm without being agent-responsible for it. This is arguably so when: 
(1) the intruder’s agency was not involved at all (e.g., because an unforeseeable gust of wind 
blew her against the right-holder), (2) the intruder’s agency was involved but her autonomy was 
radically impaired (e.g., the actions of psychotics or of someone in an extreme panic), or (3) the 
intruder’s autonomous agency was involved but the intruder could not have reasonably known 
that her choice would have the specified result (e.g., she could not have known that the terrorist 
had rigged the light switch to set off the bomb). 
Agent-responsibility, it should be stressed, is relative to a specified outcome. One can be 
agent-responsible for some outcomes (e.g., the foreseeable results within one’s control) but not 
for others (e.g., those results that could not have been foreseen). Suppose, for example, that an 
agent intentionally shoots another in the leg because she reasonably but falsely believes that the 
other is a terrorist about to set off a bomb. She is agent-responsible for the foreseeable harm but 
not for violating the innocent person’s rights (even though she does violate his rights). It should 
also be noted that agent-responsibility for harming a person entails nothing about whether the 
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 See, for example, Fischer and Ravizza 1999, Vallentyne 2008, and the many references in 
each. For simplicity in the present paper, I assume that agents are fully agent-responsible for the 
foreseen or reasonably foreseeable results of their autonomous choices. In Vallentyne 2008, 
however, I defend the view that agents are agent-responsible only for the (foreseeable) 
probability shift that their autonomous choices induce. This is a more limited conception of 
agent-responsibility. 
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harming was morally permissible. One can be agent-responsible for morally permissible harms 
(e.g., against a terrorist to stop her attack) and for morally impermissible harms (e.g., against 
innocents with no valid justification). Agent-responsibility for an outcome merely establishes 
that the outcome is suitably attributable to one’s autonomous agency. 
I shall suggest below that the duty to compensate depends in part on issues of agent-
responsibility, and hence on what the agent knew or reasonably should have known. It’s 
important to note that the appeal to agent-responsibility is for determining the extent of the duty 
to compensate. I do not claim—indeed, I would deny—that whether an intrusion, infringement, 
or violation takes place depends on agent-responsibility or what the agent knew or should have 
known.12 The only claim is that the duty to compensate for damages from an intrusion so 
depends. Whether an intrusion took place is one question; the extent to which the intruder is 
liable for the resulting harm is another.  
When an intruder owes compensation for an intrusion-harm, what is the currency of the 
debt? It is often assumed that some kind of cash-value payment (in cash or resources) is owed, 
and this may make sense for legal duties to compensate. For morality, however, it seems 
mistaken. The relevant harm imposed was a loss in life prospects for wellbeing and it seems 
more plausible that an offsetting increase in such prospects is what is owed. Obviously, there are 
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 For a defense of the irrelevance of fault to rights-infringement, see Thomson 1990, 229-234. 
For a defense of the irrelevance of intention or fault to permissibility, see Thomson 1991, 294-
96. I agree with these arguments, except that I would argue that autonomous agency is a 
necessary condition for both rights-infringements and impermissible actions (a claim that she 
denies elsewhere). 
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many possible conceptions of wellbeing and of prospects that might be invoked here, but I shall 
leave this aspect of the position open. The important point is that, although a cash payment (or 
equivalent) may often discharge a duty to compensate, when it does, it is the means and not the 
end. Suppose, for example, that I owe you compensation for a 10-unit loss of wellbeing and, 
before I discharge this debt, the cost of providing this increase in wellbeing increases from $100 
to $1000 (e.g., because you have an accident that limits your ability for gains in wellbeing). I still 
owe you 10-units of wellbeing, no matter what the cost (as opposed to only owing you only $100 
plus interest). The currency of compensation is life prospects (for wellbeing), not cash value.13 
Although I believe that the only reparation duties agents have in virtue of a rights-
intrusion are duties to compensate, I do not assume that here. I leave open, for example, whether 
there are duties to apologize or submit to punishment. My only claim is that the duty to 
compensate is a duty to provide an offsetting increase in life prospects. Thus, if an intrusion 
benefits the right-holder (e.g., accidentally or because done paternalistically), no compensation is 
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 Goodin (1989) distinguishes between two kinds of compensation: Means-replacing 
compensation requires providing equivalent means for pursuing the same ends (e.g., a prosthetic 
leg for a lost leg), whereas ends-displacing compensation merely requires providing the means 
for offsetting the lost wellbeing whether or not it permits the equivalent pursuit of ends (e.g., a 
sum of money sufficient for achieving the same level of wellbeing, even if not sufficient to buy a 
prosthetic leg). Goodin defends the stronger, means-replacing, form of compensation, whereas I 
would argue in favor of the weak, ends-displacing form of compensation. What matters, I would 
argue, is offsetting the lost prospects for wellbeing, not necessarily restoring any particular 
capability (in the sense of Sen). For related argument, see Vallentyne 2005. 
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owed. 
I shall now suggest that the duty to compensate for an intrusion-harm depends on 
whether the intruder was agent-responsible for violating the right (e.g., knew that she was 
violating the right). Strict liability, I suggest, holds if she is so agent-responsible but not if she is 
not agent-responsible for acting wrongly (e.g., was not acting wrongly at all or could not have 
known that she was acting wrongly). As far as I know, the idea of making the duty to 
compensate depend on agent-responsibility for a rights violation (or perhaps, more generally, 
acting wrongly) has not been systematically developed. Below, I shall take a first step in 
articulating and motivating such a position. I will not, however, attempt a full defense. 
 
2. Where the Intruder Is Not Agent-Responsible for Wrongly Intruding upon the Right 
 
To start, we shall consider the case where an intruder is not agent-responsible for wrongly 
intruding upon the right (“non-culpable” intrusion). This is compatible with the intruder being 
agent-responsible for some intrusion-harm, since the agent may have intended the harm 
reasonably believing that she was acting permissibly. (Keep in mind that agent-responsibility is 
relative to some specified outcome.) In such cases, the intruder’s duty of compensation is 
limited, I suggest, to compensating for the intrusion-harm, if any, for which she is agent-
responsible (and not for intrusion-harms that were not the result of her autonomous choices or 
that were reasonably unforeseeable). 
There are three relevant kinds of case where the intruder is not agent-responsible for 
wrongly intruding upon the right. In one, the agent intruded upon the right, but did not do so as 
the result of an autonomous choice (e.g., the wind blew her against the intrudee, or she struck at 
11 
him while insane or in an extreme panic). In such cases, the intruder does not act wrongly (since 
her autonomous agency was not involved; it was a mere bodily movement), and hence she is not 
agent-responsible for wrongly intruding upon the right. My general claim is that intruders who 
are not agent-responsible for wrongly intruding owe compensation only for any intrusion-harm 
for which they are agent-responsible. In the case where there is no autonomous agency involved, 
the intruder is not agent-responsible for anything and hence owes no compensation for the 
intrusion-harm imposed. This seems correct. Although the agent’s body is causally connected 
with the intrusion-harm, her agency is not. There is therefore little reason for her, rather than 
someone else, to have a duty to compensate for that harm.14  
This does not mean that the intrudee has no right to compensation for the intrusion-harm. 
It merely means that he has no special right against the intruder. If, as I believe, individuals have 
a (perhaps limited) right, against others in general, to be compensated for below-average brute-
luck wellbeing (i.e., wellbeing for which they are not agent-responsible), then the intrudee may 
well be eligible for at least partial compensation for the intrusion-harm. There is, however, little 
reason to hold the non-autonomous intruder accountable for such compensation. 
A second case where the intruder is not agent-responsible for wrongly intruding upon the 
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 One argument for strict liability is based on the idea that (1) individuals fully own their bodies 
and various other things, and (2) full ownership includes the right to full compensation from the 
intruder. Although I agree that individuals fully own their bodies, I claim that full ownership is 
indeterminate with respect to compensation and enforcement rights (roughly, because they 
conflict with a full immunity to loss of rights). For elaboration, see Vallentyne, Steiner, and 
Otsuka 2005. 
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right is one where she autonomously intruded upon (i.e., infringed) the right but did not violate 
the right because the right was not absolute and was justifiably overridden (e.g., to avoid social 
catastrophe). Here, we further suppose that she did not violate anyone else’s rights or any 
impersonal constraint. (We’ll return to those issues below.) Thus, the intrusion was permissible. 
Perhaps pushing a harmless innocent person on top of a terrorist to prevent the latter from setting 
off a bomb is such a case. What compensation is owed for such permissible intrusions? Some 
might argue that compensation is owed only for violations of rights and not for permissible 
infringements. It seems more plausible, however, to hold that compensation of some sort is owed 
even in the latter cases. Although it may be permissible to infringe rights in special cases, there is 
little reason to hold that the right to compensation would be eliminated in such cases.15 In any 
case, my main claim here is that, if compensation is owed to the intrudee in such cases, it is 
limited—given that the intruder was acting permissibly—to the intrusion-harm for which the 
intruder was agent-responsible. She owes the intrudee no compensation for intrusion-harms that 
she did not foresee and could not have foreseen. 
Suppose, for example, that an agent takes the initiative to gently push a harmless 
innocent to stop a terrorist from bombing. Suppose that the agent could not have foreseen the 
result that the innocent person suffers a freak devastating injury from the gentle push. Nor could 
she have foreseen that several bystanders would also be injured by the act. It seems unreasonable 
to hold that the agent must fully compensate these innocents for the harm imposed, as opposed to 
the reasonably foreseeable harm (for which she is agent-responsible). As noted above, this does 
not entail that the innocents are not owed compensation by others in general. 
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 See for example, Thomson 1976; 1977; 1980; 1990, 91-98, for a defense of this view. 
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It might be objected that, where an agent permissibly infringes someone’s rights to 
prevent harm to others, others have a duty to share in the compensation owed to the infringee. 
The duty to compensate for infringement-harms for which the infringer is agent-responsible does 
not, it is suggested, fall entirely on the infringer in such a case. I do not here rule out the 
possibility that, in such cases, others owe the infringer their fair share of the compensation cost 
that she incurs towards the infringee. I merely claim that the infringer owes full compensation to 
the infringer for the intrusion-harms for which she is agent-responsible. She is agent-responsible 
for the infringement-harm in question, and she owes a duty to the infringee to provide such 
compensation. She may also have a right to collect from others, but that is a separate issue. The 
failure of others, for example, to provide their fair share of the owed compensation does not 
affect the duty the infringer owes the infringee. 
 A third and final case where the intruder is not agent-responsible for wrongly intruding 
upon the right is one where she (wrongly) violates the right but could not have reasonably known 
that she was doing so (e.g., all the evidence strongly supported the mistaken view that the 
intrudee was a terrorist about to set off a bomb).16 My claim is that the duty to compensate in this 
case is no different from that of the previous case where the intruder permissibly infringed the 
right. Admittedly, in this case, the action is wrong and in the above case, it is not. In neither case, 
however, does the agent bear any responsibility for acting wrongly, since she could not 
                                                 
16
 It’s important to keep in mind that the justifying conditions for a right are based on the 
objective facts about the situation and not merely the evidence that the agent has. Thus, an agent 
can violate a right even though all her evidence suggests that it is permissible to infringe the 
right. 
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reasonably have known that she was acting wrongly in this third case. It thus seems plausible 
that, in this third case (like the second), the intruder must compensate the intrudee only for the 
intrusion-harm for which she is agent-responsible.17 
 
3. Where the Intruder Is Agent-Responsible for Violating the Right 
 
Where an intruder is not agent-responsible for wrongly intruding upon the right, she owes the 
intrudee, I have claimed, compensation only for the intrusion-harm for which she is agent-
responsible. In such cases, strict liability for all intrusion-harm is excessive, given that the 
intruder had no reason to believe that she was acting wrongly. Things are different, I suggest, 
where the agent is agent-responsible for (wrongly) violating the right. In such cases, the agent 
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 The main objection to the claim that agents who are not agent-responsible for wrongly 
intruding have a duty to compensate only for intrusion-harms for which they are agent-
responsible is that it is insufficiently demanding. I here mention, but do not pursue, an objection 
that this view is too demanding. Suppose that the agent does not foresee how expensive it will be 
to compensate for the intrusion-harms for which she is agent-responsible. Perhaps she correctly 
foresaw a small intrusion-harm but did not foresee that it would be very expensive to increase 
the intrudee’s wellbeing by that small amount (e.g., because the intrudee has some very unusual 
condition). For example, the intruder believed that the 10-unit loss of wellbeing would cost the 
usual $100 but in fact it will cost one million dollars. This raises the question of whether the duty 
to compensate should also be limited, on a responsibility view, by the cost of compensation that 
the intruder could have reasonably foreseen. I doubt it, but I don’t see clearly. 
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has, or should have, “a guilty mind”. She knows, or should reasonably know, that she is violating 
the right, and it seems reasonable that she should be morally accountable for the full intrusion-
harm even if greater than she reasonably believed it to be (strict liability). 
 A weak version of my claim is simply that the duties of compensation are more onerous 
when one is responsible for violating the right (e.g., when one does so knowingly) than when one 
is not responsible for wrongly intruding (e.g., when one does not act wrongly or when one does 
so but could not have known that one was doing so). The key claim here is that the culpability of 
the intruder (in the sense of being agent-responsible for the violation) is relevant to the duty of 
compensation, just as many think it is for liability to punishment. I have no argument here. I just 
can’t see why this wouldn’t be so. Those who knowingly violate a right are subject to higher 
standards of compensation than those who are not responsible for wrongly intruding. 
 My key claim, of course, is the much stronger claim that the intruder in such cases is 
liable for the entire intrusion-harm and not merely the portion for which she is agent-responsible. 
The main objection to this position is that it is too severe. Suppose that I knowingly violate your 
rights by flicking your ear, and I reasonably expect that this will cause you only minor harm. 
Suppose further that I could not have foreseen the fact that you have a special condition 
(physiological or psychological) that ensures that you suffer great harm from my intrusion. Do I 
really owe you a large increase in life prospects, given that I could not have known that you 
would suffer such great harm? My claim is that I do. One can avoid the risk of being so liable by 
avoiding being agent-responsible for acting wrongly. One can do that simply by not acting in 
ways that one knows, or should reasonably know, are wrong. Although severe, this is much 
weaker than the general strict liability view (which holds agents strictly liable even if they are 
not agent-responsible for acting wrongly). 
16 
 This is not to say that intruders held strictly liable must bear the full cost of providing the 
required compensation. Often, they could not have reasonably expected that they would have to 
bear these costs (as in the above example). Perhaps they reasonably believed that the intrusion-
harm would be less. To the extent that they are forced to bear costs that they could not have 
reasonably anticipated, they suffer bad brute luck (prudentially undesirable outcomes for which 
they are not agent-responsible). To the extent that everyone has a duty to pay her fair share of 
perhaps partial compensation to the victims of bad brute luck (a controversial view that I accept), 
such intruders may be eligible for compensation. The point here is that, intruders who are agent-
responsible for violating rights owe full compensation to those who suffer intrusion-harm, but 
they, in turn, may be eligible (depending on brute luck equalization issues that I here leave open) 
for compensation from others, if the compensation costs are a matter of bad brute luck for 
them.18 If the compensation from others is not full, then the intruders, rather than the victims, 
must bear the shortfall. 
 Before turning to our final category (agent-responsible for acting wrongly but not for 
violating the right), I shall briefly comment on an aspect of compensation that has not yet been 
addressed. We have been focusing on compensation owed to the intrudee. Often, of course, an 
intrusion harms non-intrudees as well. For example, if someone beats me up, my wife will suffer 
as well. Is she owed compensation by the intruder? A common view is that one has rights to 
compensation only for intrusion-harms suffered from intrusions upon one’s own rights. On this 
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 My own view is that even intentional criminals suffer bad brute luck, and are eligible for 
compensation, when they have a reasonable but false belief that the chances of their being 
punished are low. This, however, is a controversial view. 
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view, my wife has no right to compensation, since her rights were not intruded upon.19 This 
seems correct when the intruder is not agent-responsible for acting wrongly (e.g., acted 
permissibly, or reasonably believed she was so acting). When she is agent-responsible for 
violating someone’s rights (e.g., does so knowingly), however, it seems very plausible to me that 
the intruder should be liable for all the intrusion-harm for which she is responsible—both the 
direct intrusion-harm to the intrudee and the indirect intrusion-harm to third parties. In such 
cases, the intruder knew (or should have known) that she was violating someone’s rights. If she 
also knew that this would harm others, it seems entirely appropriate for her to owe them a duty 
of compensation for their harm that she foresaw from the intrusion. (Yes, as Ian Carter objected, 
this means that you owe compensation to a lot of people, if you beat up a beloved national 
figure, knowing that you were violating her rights and also causing others to thereby suffer. This 
seems right to me. Why should anyone else have to bear the cost?) Indeed, one might even argue 
that intruders who are agent-responsible for violating someone’s rights owe full compensation—
not only to the intrudee, but also—to third parties harmed by the intrusion (even if the intruder 
could not reasonably foresee that harm). Obviously, that is a big issue, and I raise it here merely 
to flag it for further consideration.20 
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 For insightful analysis of the tendency in American tort law to restrict duties of compensation 
to those whose legal rights were violated, see Zipursky 1998. 
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 Coleman (1992, ch. 17; 1994) argues that one owes compensation for wrongful harms for 
which one is responsible. He understands a harm to be wrongful when it is either wrong or the 
result of an infringement of the harmed individual’s rights. Thus, he agrees that one can owe 
third parties compensation for losses to their legitimate interests when one acts wrongly but 
18 
 
4. Where the Intruder is Agent-Responsible for Wrongly Intruding upon But Not for Violating 
the Right 
 
I shall now briefly address a case of which I am less sure. It is where the intruder is not agent-
responsible for violating the right but is agent-responsible for wrongly intruding upon the right. 
This can arise because not all impermissible intrusions of a person’s right are violations of that 
right. There may be no violation of that right because justificatory conditions hold for that 
intrusion (e.g., the intrusion is necessary to avoid social catastrophe), but the intrusion may still 
be impermissible (wrong) for other reasons. It may violate an impersonal constraint21 or it may 
violate someone else’s rights. (The justificatory condition for the given right may not justify 
violating the impersonal constraint or someone else’s right.) Thus, an agent may know that she is 
wrongly intruding upon a person’s right without believing that she is violating that right. 
 Above I claimed that one is strictly liable for intrusion-harm when one is agent-
responsible for violating the right. Is this also true when one is agent-responsible for wrongly 
intruding upon the right but not for violating it? I am not sure, but I shall briefly comment on this 
issue. 
 There are four possible cases based on the following two dimensions: (1) Is the intruder 
                                                                                                                                                             
without infringing their rights. 
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 I would argue that there are no impersonal constraints. All impermissible acts wrong some 
being with moral standing. Here, however, I leave open the possibility of impersonal constraints, 
since I believe that they are conceptually possible. 
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not agent-responsible for violating the right because she does not violate the right at all, or 
because she violates the right but could not have reasonably known that she was? (2) Is the 
intruder agent-responsible for acting wrongly because she violates an impersonal (non-rights-
based) constraint or because she violates someone else’s rights? Here is an example of the easiest 
case to justify strict liability: where the intruder violates (as opposed to merely infringes) the 
intrudee’s rights but could not have known that she was doing so (and thus is not agent-
responsible for doing so) and she is agent-responsible for violating someone else’s rights. 
Suppose that I knowingly push A onto B in order to knock over B. I do this because I reasonably, 
but falsely, believe that B is a terrorist and that knocking him over is the only way to stop the 
bomb from going off. In fact, B is perfectly innocent. Thus, I violate the rights of both A and B. I 
am not, however, agent-responsible for violating B’s rights, because I could not have reasonably 
known that I was doing so (since I reasonably believed that justificatory conditions held). 
Suppose further that I knew that it was not necessary to push A in order to knock over B. I knew 
that I could just as easily and effectively have pushed B directly. Out of negligence or malice, I 
nonetheless pushed A. I thus am agent-responsible for violating A’s rights. The suggestion of the 
previous section entails that I am strictly liable for the intrusion-harm that I imposed on A (since 
I am agent-responsible for violating his rights). Here, our question concerns what I owe B. I am 
agent-responsible for wrongly intruding against him (because I knowingly intrude upon B’s 
rights in pushing A onto to him and I know that this is wrong because I know it violates A’s 
rights). I am not, however, responsible for violating B’s rights. What do I owe B? 
My inclination is to think that I owe full compensation for the intrusion-harm that I 
impose on here. More generally, the intruder is strictly liable to all intrudees in all four cases 
above. This is because it seems to me (very tentatively!) that what matters is that the intruder is 
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agent-responsible for wrongly intruding. She knows, or should reasonably know, that she is 
acting wrongly. It doesn’t matter whether she is agent-responsible for violating an impersonal 
constraint, someone else’s rights, or the rights of the intrudee in question.22 In all cases, she has, 
or should have, a “guilty mind”.23 That, it seems to me, is enough to put her on the hook for strict 
liability, at least where she is violating the intrudee’s rights (without knowing she is). Moreover, 
it seems to me that the strict liability does not depend on whether she is permissibly infringing 
the right or violating it, since in both cases she could not reasonably have known that she was 
wrongly intruding.  
 These are, however, mere speculations. My purpose here is to draw attention to the case, 
not to resolve it. 
                                                 
22
 In the previous section, I raised the possibility that those agent-responsible for violating rights 
are strictly liable to all victims—even if their rights are not intruded upon. If this is so, then it 
follows that they are strictly liable to those who rights they intrude upon in such cases. I 
tentatively suggested, however, that this was too draconian. It seemed more plausible that they 
would be liable to all victims, but only for the intrusion-harm for which they were agent-
responsible. If this is so, then our question about our main case remains. 
23
 Unlike theories of retributive punishment, however, the point is not to impose a harm on the 
violator but rather to hold that the violator, rather than someone else, has a duty to bear the cost 
of the rights-violation. My proposal is thus, I believe, in the same spirit as the “justice-based” 
(McMahan 2002, 402) or “responsibility-based” (McMahan 2005, 394) accounts of liability to 
the use of force. I here focus on the duty to compensate, whereas McMahan focuses on liability 
to the use of force, but the general issues are, I believe, roughly the same. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
I have suggested, without compelling argument, that those who are agent-responsible for 
violating rights—and perhaps also those who are agent-responsible for wrongly intruding upon 
rights—owe the intrudee compensation for the entire intrusion-harm whereas those who are not 
agent-responsible for wrongly intruding upon rights are only liable for compensating the 
intrusion-harm for which they are responsible (e.g., could reasonably have foreseen). If this is 
right, then strict liability is correct for those who are agent-responsible for violating rights and 
fault liability is correct for those who are not agent responsible for wrongly intruding upon 
rights. Culpability (agent-responsibility for acting wrongly) thus seems relevant not only for 
liability to punishment but also for duties to compensate. My goal has been to articulate a 
promising position and provide enough motivation for it to be taken seriously. Further work is 
needed to refine the position and to see whether it is genuinely promising.24
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 For helpful comments, I thank Dani Attas, Ian Carter, Helen Frowe, Matt Kramer, Mike 
Otsuka, Hillel Steiner, and Jonathan Vertanen. 
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